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I. Introduction
Since the housing market peaked in 2006,2 American home values
have fallen twenty percent across the country.3 As a result of declining
home equity, one in ten Americans with mortgages are in financial
trouble.4 Six million Americans with outstanding subprime loans 5 are at
1. In re Foreclosure Cases, No. 1:07cv2282, et al., 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3
(N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) [hereinafter Boyko].
2. FDIC: Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chairman, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation on Strengthening the Economy: Foreclosure Prevention and Neighborhood
Preservation: Before the Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs; January 31,
2008 in SUBPRIME CREDIT CRISIS: EVERYTHING You NEED TO KNOW 727, 729 (Practicing
Law Institute, 2008) [hereinafter Bair Testimony] (noting that the U.S. housing boom of the
first half of the 2000s ended abruptly in 2006).
3. David M. Abromowitz, When in Doubt, Yell "Fannie Mae," HUFFINGTON POST,
Sept. 19, 2008, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david-m-abromowitz/when-in-doubt-yell-
fannie b 127688.html (last visited October 19, 2009) ("When prices drop in a
neighborhood, they don't just fall on homes with subprime loans... [f]or the first time since
the Great Depression, American home values nationally fell nearly 20% since their peak,
and in some places much more.") (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights
and Social Justice).
4. Id.
5. A subprime loan is generally defined as a loan given to a buyer who would not
otherwise qualify for a prime loan. Reform Foreclosure, Predatory Mortgage and Payday
Lending in America's Cities Before the H. Comm. on Oversight and Government, 110th
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risk of defaulting.6 As homeowners go into default, lenders rush into court
to foreclose.7 As more homes remain vacant in neighborhoods, the housing
value of entire neighborhoods decreases further in a vicious cycle.8 These
figures suggest that the mortgage foreclosure crisis is not a self-contained
problem.9
Part I of this Note discusses the origins of the mortgage foreclosure
crisis. Specifically, it tracks the path of a mortgage from securitization to
foreclosure. It highlights the legal issues that arise when a trustee in
possession of toxic securities backed by mortgages that are currently in
default wants to instigate foreclosure proceedings. Part II addresses
defaulting mortgagors' standing defense to foreclosure proceedings
instigated by trustees holding securitized mortgages. It argues that this
defense is not only a technical defense, but it is also a direct way to
confront the legal issue caused by the securitization of mortgages when it
comes time to collect: Who has the right to foreclose? Part III examines
the ways that legislation can incentivize loan servicers to renegotiate
Cong. 4 (2007), (testimony of Josh Nassar, Center for Responsible Lending), available at
http://oversight.house.gov/documents/200703 22175553-40982.pdf. To offset the risk,
subprime loans generally carry higher interest rates than prime loans offered to creditworthy
borrowers and charge additional fees. Id. All subprime loans are not predatory. Id. This
Note will not distinguish between defenses available to homeowners who have defaulted on
predatory loans versus those who have defaulted on non-predatory loans.
6. CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, ANY REAL SOLUTION MUST STOP
FORECLOSURES 1 (Sept. 23, 2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/policy-legislation/congressbailout-one-pager.pdf.
7. See Boyko, No. 1:07cv2282, et al., 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2007) (discussing that the lenders' decisions to file for foreclosure as fast as possible is
driven by monetary concerns).
8. See CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, PERMITTING JUDICIAL MODIFICATION OF
HOME LOANS WOULD SAVE 600,000 HOMES-PURCHASE OF SECURITIES WILL NOT SAVE
ANY 1 (Sept. 19, 2008), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-
legislation/congress/crl-judicial-mod-of-home-mortgages-brf.pdf (supporting the proposition
that when families cannot pay their loans, foreclosures increase, causing neighborhoods go
into decline, causing more financial institutions to go under, causing even more
foreclosures).
9. Although, undoubtedly, foreclosures disproportionately affect low-income and
minority communities who were specifically targeted by subprime mortgage lenders. See
e.g., DEBBIE GRUENSTEIN BOCIAN, KEITH S. ERNST & WEI LI, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE
LENDING, UNFAIR LENDING: THE EFFECT OF RACE AND ETHNICITY ON THE PRICE OF SUBPRIME
MORTGAGES 4-5 (May 31, 2006), http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-
lending/research-analysis/rrO I1-UnfairLending-0506.pdf (noting that several research
analyses of subprime mortgage data revealed that "African-American and Latino borrowers
received a disproportionate share of higher-rate [subprime] home loans, even when
controlling for factors such as borrower income and property location").
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mortgages that are at risk of default. It argues that federal legislation may
offer a more permanent solution to the mortgage foreclosure crisis.
This Note concludes that a case-by-case approach to the mortgage
foreclosure crisis, or a solution that relies on litigating individual claims as
mortgagors go into default, is admirable because it assigns the costs of
securitization to one party-the trustee-and only in cases in which the
trustee of the securitized mortgage has brought a foreclosure action
wrongfully in violation of true sale requirements. It narrowly targets only
wrongdoers by dismissing foreclosure proceedings when the trustee lacks
standing. However, litigating claims individually does not provide enough
incentive to trustees to settle claims before coming to court; therefore, it is
not a proactive or permanent solution.
By contrast, when a third party, such as a governmental entity,
assumes the costs of securitization, all parties-the trustee, the loan
servicer, and the mortgagor-are incentivized to renegotiate the terms of
the underlying mortgage. While the loan servicer and the mortgagor can
enter into loan renegotiation voluntarily, thereby dividing the costs of
securitization between these two parties, in reality the trustee has no
incentive to do so for fear of lawsuits by holders of securitized debt
instruments. By enacting legislation that defines the liability of servicers to
the holders of the securitized notes, servicers will be incentivized to
renegotiate loans because there will be no hidden costs. Finally, either
option is preferable to the current system where the homeowner is stuck
paying for the costs of securitizing her mortgage.
II. Origins of the Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis
A. Deregulation
The current mortgage foreclosure crisis was precipitated by the liberal
policies of financial regulators and the governments who facilitated the
climate of deregulation on Wall Street beginning in the 1980s.'
10. See Robert Wade, Financial Regime Change?, 53 NLR 5, 12 (2008) ("It is no
exaggeration to say that the crisis stems from the biggest regulatory failure in modem
history."). Wade uses the term "neoliberalism" to label the economic model in place from
1975 to 2008 that encouraged governments to liberalize, privatize, and deregulate as part of
financial globalization. Id. at 5. But Peter Gowan notes that in addition to the neoliberalism
theory espoused by Wade, there is the "accidents" theory which blames the crisis on the
negligent interplay of Greenspan's Federal Reserve, banks, regulators, and ratings agencies.
Peter Gowan, Crisis in the Heartland: Consequences of the New Wall Street System, 55
NLR 5, 19-20 (2009). Gowan's thesis, however, rejects both the neoliberal and accidents
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Deregulation" enabled financial institutions to carry high debt-to-equity
ratios, 12 create complex financial instruments, 3 and trade those instruments
in opaque markets.' 4  By the 1980s, with the aid of Washington, the
financial services industry had repositioned itself atop a new global
capitalist structure, and its importance in the new structure was reinforced
from within it by new actors, new practices, and new dynamics created in
the increasingly global world of finance. 5 Specifically, deregulation and
lower interest rates encouraged the rise of the lender-trader model,
speculative arbitrage, highly leveraged banks, the shadow banking sector
(and with it, new types of securities), speculative trading in asset bubbles,
and reliance on credit derivatives.
6
theories and argues that that the new structure of Wall Street was not haphazard at all, but
was an orchestrated complex system that was preordained to fail because government no
longer regulated securities that were inherently flawed. Id. at 20-21.
11. For a list of twelve deregulatory steps that led to the financial meltdown, see
ROBERT WEISSMAN & JAMES DONAHUE, CONSUMER EDUCATION FOUNDATION, SOLD-OUT:
How WALL STREET AND WASHINGTON BETRAYED AMERICA (Mar. 2009),
www.wallstreetwatch.org/reports/sold out.pdf. The twelve steps Weissman lists are: (1) the
repeal of Glass-Steagall, (2) off-the-books accounting for banks, (3) preventing the
Commodities Future Trading Commission from regulating derivatives, (4) financial
derivative deregulation under the Commodities Futures Modernization Act, (5) removal of
SEC capital limits on investment banks, (6) weak capital reserve requirements for banks
under Basel II, (7) failure to police predatory lending, (8) federal laws that preempted state
policing of predatory lending, (9) failure to hold assignees of mortgages liable, (10) Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac's insuring subprime mortgages, (11) bank merger mania which
created a too-big-to-fail mentality, and (12) the failure of credit ratings agencies to properly
inform investors about risk. Id. at 21-98.
12. See Wade, supra note 10, at 12 ("[I]t was acceptable in the eyes of the authorities
for investment banks to operate with a debt to equity ratio of 30-35:1."). In 2004, the
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) relaxed the net-capital rule. Gowan, supra note
10, at 15. The result of this was that investment banks were allowed to decide their own
leverage. Id.
13. E.g., mortgage-backed securities. See David Goldstein & Kevin G. Hall, Private
Sector Loans, Not Fannie or Freddie, Triggered Crisis, MCCLATCHY WASHINGTON BUREAU
(Oct. 12, 2008) http://www.mcclatchydc.com/251/story/53802.htm (last visited Oct. 19,
2009) (defining mortgage-backed securities as "mortgages that are sold to a company,
usually an investment bank, which then pools and sells them into the secondary mortgage
market") (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
14. See Wade, supra note 10, at 12 (describing this model of banking as encouraging
"high leverage, complex financial instruments and opaque markets, all of which put this
crisis in a league of its own").
15. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 6 (labeling the financial structures, actors, practices,
and dynamics that came about in the wake of neoliberal policies as the "New Wall Street
System").
16. See id. at 7-8 (identifying these six major policies as the foundation of the "New
Wall Street System").
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In the late 1990s, deregulation, which had passively contributed to the
creation of the new structure of Wall Street, became an actively pursued
governmental policy within the global financial services industry, largely
due to the five billion dollars spent by Wall Street from 1998-2008 on
lobbying the government to deregulate.' 7 In 1997, then-Chancellor of the
Exchequer Gordon Brown set up the UK Financial Services Authority, a
body that assumed jurisdiction over bank regulation (or more aptly, the lack
thereof).' 8 The resulting "light-touch regulation"'19 was the culmination of
the UK's plan to lure financial business away from New York a plan that
dates back to the Thatcher government. 20  Prompting a reply from
Washington, in 1999, the United States Senate and House of
Representatives repealed the Glass-Steagall Act,2' casting it aside as a relic
of depression-era regulation that was no longer needed.22 The effect was
"de facto financial liberalization. '" 23 The structure of the new Wall Street
was not only reinforced from within the financial services industry by new
products and dynamics,24 but it was also fully supported by the United
States government.
17. See WEISSMAN, supra note 11, at 99 (noting that the financial sector as a whole
spent more than $1.738 billion on federal election campaign contributions between 1998 and
2008). An additional $3.3 billion was spent on officially registered lobbyists during the
same time period. Id.
18. Gowan, supra note 10, at 16.
19. The Financial Services Authority operated by the principal that Wall Street banks
could regulate themselves). Id. As a result, London became "the place where you could do
abroad what you could not do back home [in New York]; in this instance, a location for
regulatory arbitrage." Id.
20. See Wade, supra note 10, at 12 (discussing the United Kingdom's often
underemphasized role in the financial crisis).
21. See Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-102, 113 Stat. 1338
(1999) (repealing part of the Glass-Steagall Act of 1933, 48 Stat. 162 (1933) (codified in
scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.), which separated commercial banking activities from
investment banking activities). For Congressional intent behind passing the Glass-Steagall
Act, see S. REP. No. 73-77, at 18 (1933). Congress was concerned with the subtle hazards
that occur when a commercial bank enters the investment banking business and ceases to
merely be a fiduciary agent. Id.
22. See Wade, supra note 10, at 12 (describing those who viewed the Glass-Steagall
Act as an "onerous" regulation and noting that political momentum grew in the 1990s to
repeal it).
23. See id. (arguing that gutting the Glass-Steagall Act allowed banks to engage in
commercial banking, underwriting, and investment banking). See generally Stephen
Labaton, Congress Passes Wide-Ranging Bill Easing Bank Laws, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 1999,
at Al (describing briefly arguments for and against the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act).
24. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 7-8 (identifying the major policies as the rise of the
lender-trader model, speculative arbitrage, maximizing leverage, the rise of the shadow
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B. Securitization and the Rise of the Shadow Banking Sector
The securitization 26 of mortgages and the rise of the shadow banking
sector in particular have had important roles in the mortgage foreclosure
crisis. 27  When the Federal Reserve slashed interest rates in 2002,
borrowing money became inexpensive and the home-lending industry
profited by changing from an originate-to-own to an originate-to-lend
business model.28 Mortgage originators stopped holding onto mortgages
and started selling them to third parties, such as investment banks or
government sponsored entities (GSEs), and used the capital to finance new
mortgages. 29  The mortgage originators were incentivized to sell the
mortgages because they could make a profit quickly and distribute the risk
of default to others. 30  The documented rise in subprime lending
exacerbated this cycle: Mortgage originators sought new customers to
increase the profit they made from selling mortgages on the secondary
market and mortgages became easier to obtain.
31
banking system and new types of securities, transformation of money markets into funders
of speculative trading in asset bubbles, and the new centrality of credit derivatives).
25. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 20 (stating that over the course of American history
there have been phases of tension between Wall Street and Congress as well as between
Wall Street and the executive branch, but during the last twenty-five years all three entities
have become well integrated).
26. See Karl Beitel, The Subprime Debacle, MONTHLY REVIEW, May 2008, available
at http://www.monthlyreview.org/080512beitel.php (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (defining
securitization as the process of transforming formerly illiquid loans held in the mortgage
originator's own portfolio into negotiable assets traded on a secondary market) (on file with
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
27. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 13 (documenting how deregulation facilitated the
rise of the shadow banking sector).
28. See Arun Gupta, Financial Meltdown 101, THE INDYPENDENT, Oct. 13, 2008,
available at http://www.alternet.org/story/102672 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (explaining
that low interest rates made it easier for homebuyers and banks to borrow money and to take
on larger mortgages, which increased rising home prices) (on file with Washington and Lee
Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). The interest rate was lowered from 6.5% in May
2000, to 1% in June 2003. The Federal Reserve Board, Open Market Operations,
http://www.federalreserve.gov/fomc/fundsrate.htm (last visited October 19, 2009) (on file
with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
29. Id.
30. See Beitel, supra note 26 ("These instruments [MBSs] are today the major
conduits of funding new mortgage loans, the vast majority of which are issued under
expectation that they will be sold into the secondary mortgage market.").
31. See Cathy Lesser Mansfield, The Road to Subprime "Hel" Was Paved With Good
Congressional Intentions: Usury Deregulation and the Subprime Home Equity Market, 51
S.C. L. Rev. 473, 531 (2000) (arguing that securitization and the increased number of
mortgage brokers helped the subprime home equity market grow rapidly in the 1990s).
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In order to make the mortgages appear less risky to third-party
purchasers, mortgage originators obtained assurance from GSEs (e.g.,
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, and Ginnie Mae) certifying that the loans were
prime.32 After they sold the guaranteed loans to investment banks, the
banks pooled the mortgages together and issued a bond called a mortgage-
backed security (MBS), whose yield was based on the amortization
payments of the underlying mortgage debt.33 The banks then sold the
MBSs into a secondary market to wealthy or institutional investors (such as
pension funds) and made money by subtracting a servicing fee for
underwriting the debt.34
In addition to government-guaranteed MBSs, private firms also issued
private label MBSs, typically with some form of credit enhancement to
obtain a higher credit rating. 35 However, throughout the 2000s, firms issued
private label MBSs with little or no credit enhancement that were stamped
with the same high credit ratings.36 The MBSs appeared to carry the same
minimal risk, but were in fact much riskier than their earlier counterparts.37
In order to obtain more cash and distribute the risk of default to more
parties, banks created exotic securitized debt instruments such as
collateralized debt obligations (CDOs).38 Financiers created CDOs by
buying up a pool of subprime mortgages and segregating the cash flows
into different tranches, each with different characteristics. 39 The different
32. See Gupta, supra note 28 (explaining that assurance "means one of the agencies
certifies that the loans are creditworthy"). In 2004, to address low rates of home ownership
among low-income populations and communities of color, Congress began encouraging
GSEs to assure even subprime mortgages. Id.
33. Id.
34. Beitel, supra note 26.
35. See CHARLES J. GOETZ, LAW AND ECONOMICS 128 (1984) (discussing the process
of credit enhancement by pooling risky investments). The policy behind pooling risk is
based on the duty to diversify and expose the investor to both gains and losses: "Whatever
the risks of any single investment, the risk-pooling effect.., can be recognized as relevant
to the duty to 'diversify."' Id. Therefore, by adding more risk, if the risks are diverse, there
is negative covariance and risk is reduced. Id. By implication, adding similarly risky loans
with a positive covariance to a pool increases risk as swings in either direction become more
pronounced. Id. at 129.
36. See http://riskglossary.com/articles/mortgagebackedsecurity.htm (last visited
Sept. 23, 2009) (defining a mortage-backed security as "a securitized interest in a pool of
mortgages" and characterizing a mortgage-backed security as a "bond" (on file with
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice)).
37. See Goetz, supra note 35 and accompanying text.
38. See Beitel, supra note 26 (defining CDOs as investment trusts backed by mortgage
pools).
39. See id. (explaining that tranches are "distinguished according to their level of
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tranches were then rated by ratings agencies based on their risk of default
and rate of return: The higher the risk of default, the larger the yield.4°
Because the ratings agencies approved and rated the tranches, purchasers of
CDOs believed their investments were low risk, even though CDOs often
only repackaged below investment-grade debt into tranches that were given
AAA ratings.4' In theory, the lowest, unrated tranches (the riskiest) would
absorb losses first and so on up the mezzanine of tranches, thereby
insulating the highest-rated tranches from losses caused by debtors who
defaulted on their mortgage loans.42
In order to increase leverage without increasing liability, banks created
structured investment vehicles (SIVs) that issued asset-backed commercial
paper (short-term debt) to raise money to buy CDOs.4 3 An entire industry
grew up to accommodate this market-the shadow banking sector-and it
was entirely unregulated. 44 SIVs were required to assure the commercial
41paper with a back-up line of credit in the event that the SIV could not pay.
SIVs bought CDOs over-the-counter in order to maximize their leverage.46
As long as the money markets were confident that the mortgage borrowers
exposure to losses from defaults occurring in the underlying mortgage pool").
40. Gupta, supra note 28.
41. Id. For a discussion of the "race to the bottom" and the role the ratings agencies
played in the mortgage foreclosure crisis, see Elliot Blair Smith, Bringing Down Wall Street
as Ratings Let Loose Subprime Scourge, BLOOMBERG, Sept. 24, 2008, available at
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601109&sid=ah839IWTLP9s& (last visited
Oct. 19, 2009) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
42. See Beitel, supra note 26 (explaining that the lowest (unrated) tranche is the first
to absorb losses, and additional losses are applied to the next tranche, and so on, up the
ladder of tranches. This theoretically provides protection to the senior tranche, which
receives the highest grade credit rating.).
43. See id. (describing how commercial paper issued by SIVs was initially a way to
reduce bank liability by causing debts to roll over at maturity when the purchaser was
confident that the borrower was solvent).
44. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 13 (explaining that SIVs, hedge funds and private
equity funds are not required to maintain a leverage ratio like banks are). But see Gupta,
supra note 28 (discussing that even banks' leverage ratios were not regulated after 2004
when the SEC loosened regulations on how much they could leverage against their capital
reserves).
45. See Beitel, supra note 26 ("To insure commercial paper will be accepted the SIV is
required to secure a back-up line of credit from the sponsoring bank as insurance in the event
that the SIV does not have sufficient cash on hand to settle these obligations at the time they
come due.").
46. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 14 ("As shadowy over-the-counter products, they did
not require the commitment of appropriate tranches of capital as collateral and thus
facilitated more leverage.").
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were solvent, debts rolled over at maturity and everyone made money.
47
But this model relied on the assumption that home values would keep
rising.48 They did not.
49
From the beginning, these securitized debt instruments were highly
risky for two reasons. First, there was no pricing mechanism for the
instruments. 50 Because there was no primary market for the instruments,
their prices were determined by speculation alone and were blindly
reinforced by ratings agencies.5" The ratings did not correspond to their
riskiness.5 Second, there was no market price for the instruments because
the source of the underlying collateral was unidentifiable after
securitization.53 Because the underlying collateral was unidentifiable, the




When the housing bubble burst, homeowners began to default, and
widespread defaults impacted securitized debt instruments.55 The market
for these debt instruments collapsed as buyers realized the risk involved in
47. See Beitel, supra note 26 ("[If] purchasers of this paper (the money market funds)
are confident that borrowers are solvent, debts are typically rolled over at maturity at the
prevailing interest rate. For this reason, the commercial paper issued by the SIVs did not
initially create any additional liabilities for the sponsoring bank.").
48. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 5 (stating that the "notion that falling house prices
could shut down half of all lending in the US economy within a matter of months... [made]
no sense").
49. See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 729 (stating that by November 2008 home
prices for the ten largest cities in the US had fallen 8.4 percent below 2007 levels and futures
trading indexes pointed to further declines in 2009).
50. Gowan, supra note 10, at 18.
51. See id. ("The CDOs were typically written by the rating agencies, for a fee, and
then given a Triple A rating by the same agency, for a second fee.").
52. See Beitel, supra note 26 ("Underwriting and monitoring standards deteriorated at
all stages of the funding circuit.").
53. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 13 (explaining that mortgage-backed securities
bundled thousands of unidentifiable mortgages together; therefore the credit-worthiness of
the mortgage holders could no longer be a factor in the securities' prices).
54. See Beitel, supra note 26 ("[Tlhe proliferation of these new forms of securitized
credit had not engineered risk out of the system of interlocking financial obligations.").
55. See Gupta, supra note 28 (noting that widespread mortgage defaults spread to
structured debt instruments like CDOs and MBSs, causing the system of distributing risk to
fail).
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investing in mortgage-backed financial products.56 Banks hoarded cash in
case they were called upon to pay for asset-backed commercial paper they
had insured." Currently, investment banks find themselves holding onto
"toxic"5 8 debt that they cannot get rid of because the underlying collateral is
worthless.59
The negative feedback loop in regional housing markets continues to
be disastrous. As subprime mortgage holders default there are two
noteworthy effects. First, investors and ratings agencies downgrade MBSs,
which reduces the availability of credit to homebuyers, which decreases
home sales.60 And second, as more homes are vacated, the prices of homes
in entire neighborhoods decrease.6' Vacant houses become vulnerable to
crime and squatters.62 As a result, many vacant homes in a single
neighborhood can drive down the price of surrounding homes that are still
occupied.63 The effect of foreclosures on neighborhoods in poor and
minority communities, where subprime loans were more concentrated, is
even more devastating.64
56. See id. ("Securitization had spread across the entire financial system-investment
and money banks, pension funds, central banks, insurance companies-putting everyone at
risk. ").
57. See Beitel, supra note 26 (explaining that when banks with SIVs realized they
would either have to provide back-up lines of credit or sell off assets to retire maturing
obligations, they were uncertain about the size and scale of their potential exposure and
began to hoard funds).
58. Id.
59. See Gowan, supra note 10, at 18 ("When the Wall Street banks tried to off-load
their CDOs, they found there was no market for them.").
60. Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 730.
61. Id. at 729.
62. See Les Christie, Crime Scene: Foreclosure, CNNMoney.com, Nov. 19, 2007,
available at http://money.cnn.com/2007/l1/16/realestate/suprirne-and-crime/index.htm
?cnn=yes (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (discussing crime in an Ohio neighborhood devastated
by foreclosures) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social
Justice).
63. See Gupta, supra note 28 (explaining that the abandonment of homes creates ghost
neighborhoods and drives down the price of still-occupied homes).
64. See BOCIAN, supra note 9, at 1 ("Our findings show that, for most types of
subprime home loans, African-American and Latino borrowers are at greater risk of
receiving higher-rate loans than white borrowers, even after controlling for legitimate risk
factors.").
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D. Legal Issues
The mortgage foreclosure crisis is at a precarious position in relation
to the debt crisis of 2008: It is both a cause65 and an effect.66 In part, the
industry's losses were inevitable as the housing bubble burst.67 In part, the
crisis was triggered by a failure to curb predatory lending practices.68 But
the securitization of home equity loans by private investment banks,
especially the securitization of subprime, Alt-A, and other nontraditional
loans, exacerbated the crisis by obfuscating legal responsibility on both
ends of the mortgage.69
A homeowner who cannot continue to pay her monthly mortgage
payments (especially when they increase drastically) cannot drive to her
local bank where she obtained her mortgage to renegotiate the terms of the
loan because the mortgage originator no longer owns the mortgage outright;
it has been assigned, securitized, and sold onto the secondary mortgage
market without the homeowner's knowledge or approval. 70  And private
investment banks that are holding onto mortgage-backed securities in trust,
65. See Wade, supra note 10, at 11 (describing the housing bubble as "one part of a
much wider run-up of debt"); Goldstein, supra note 13 (describing predatory lending
practices of the private sector as creating turmoil in the financial markets).
66. Cf Gowan, supra note 10, at 18 (arguing that the Wall Street banks deliberately
engineered the housing price bubble). Gowan argues that the housing bubble could not have
caused the credit crunch because that argument presupposes that the housing price bubble
was created by supply and demand factors, not by financial operators. Id. at 5-6.
67. See Goldstein, supra note 13 (noting the correlation between the housing boom
(2001-2007) and a surge in predatory lending (2004-2006)); Abromowitz, supra note 3
("But as has become apparent, these subprime loans were almost designed to go into default
in massive numbers.").
68. See Joshua Holland, Wall Street Hustlers Built a $100 Trillion House of Cards and
Stuck You With the Fallout, A HerNet, Oct. 22, 2008 (on file with Washington and Lee
Journal of civi Rights and Social Justice) (explaining that the high demand created by banks
selling securitized debt instruments incentivized lenders to loan to unqualified borrowers);
Goldstein, supra note 13 (discussing the gap in federal regulation over investment banks
who purchased securitized subprime loans and non-bank lenders who underwrote most
subprime loans); Abromowitz, supra note 3 (blaming the burst housing bubble on the wave
of foreclosures in late 2006 and early 2007 by borrowers who could not refinance as interest
rates spiked). For a description of predatory lending's effects on the home equity market
before the debt crisis of 2008, see Mansfield, supra note 31.
69. See Abromowitz, supra note 3 (discussing how the securitization of risky loans
was not policed by the SEC and Congressional regulators and was "blessed" by ratings
agencies).
70. See Holland, supra note 68 (discussing the "originate-to-own" model of
mortgages); Goldstein, supra note 13 (discussing the secondary market for MBSs).
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which are now worthless,7' are forced to decide whether they should
renegotiate or instigate foreclosure proceedings.
Thus, a paradoxical situation has emerged in which trustees, the
assignees of mortgages, are claiming the right to foreclose on mortgagors in
default,7 2 but at the same time, are denying that they have enough rights in
the underlying promissory note to renegotiate the terms of the loan.73 This
problem can be solved with a two-prong approach involving litigation and
federal legislation.
111. Litigation Solutions
Once the trustee instigates foreclosure proceedings, the obvious
problem that faces defaulting mortgagors is defending their nonpayment.
74
The second major hurdle for mortgagors (if they choose to litigate rather
than default) is giving the plaintiff an incentive to settle. By enforcing
standing requirements against plaintiff-lenders,75 courts can protect
homeowners and incentivize the mortgage industry to record the
assignment of obligations in a more responsible manner.
A. The Standing "Defense"
One defense that defendant-mortgagors can invoke in foreclosure
proceedings, or the court can invoke sua sponte,76 is standing. To have
71. See Eric Stein, Relieving Wall Street of Debt Does Not Translate Into the Right to
Stop Foreclosures, CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, Sept. 24, 2008,
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/gov-ltd-
power-to-modify-final.pdf (stating that "80% of subprime and Alt-A loans are securitized-
the types of loans most likely to be distressed").
72. See Boyko, No. 1:07cv2282, et al., 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2007) (discussing lenders' rush to foreclose when homeowners default).
73. But see Eggert, infra note 145 (stating that loan servicers arguably do have the
power to renegotiate loans with individual homeowners).
74. Obviously, it is never too late to challenge a case of actual fraud, but bringing
actions or asserting an affirmative defense to foreclosures based on fraudulent lending
practices is outside the subject matter of this Note. For a discussion of the homeowner's
defenses to actual fraud, see Katherine Porter, Misbehavior and Mistake in Bankruptcy
Mortgage Claims, 87 TEX. L. Rv. 121, 133-40 (2008).
75. I will use the term plaintiff-lender generically. It does not refer to the plaintiffs
status as the mortgage originator.
76. See Cent. States Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco
Managed Care, L.L.C., 433 F.3d 181, 198 (2d Cir. 2005) (stating that standing can be raised
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standing before a federal court, a plaintiff must satisfy the standing
requirements of Article III of the Constitution,7 which requires plaintiffs to
show they have suffered an injury in fact.78 If a plaintiff does not satisfy
this burden, the court must dismiss the action for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction.79 To have standing in a foreclosure action, a plaintiff-lender
must show that it was the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time
the complaint wasfiled and was harmed by the mortgagor's failure to pay.8°
Standing can be contested when there is no documented proof that the
81trustee was assigned both the underlying note and the mortgage. If the
trustee decides to foreclose but does not have sufficient documentation of
assignment of the note, assignment will not be presumed and the trustee
will not be considered a holder in due course of the underlying collateral.82
As a result, the trustee will not be able to foreclose.
sua sponte because it involves the federal court's subject matter jurisdiction (citing United
States v. Quinones, 313 F.3d 49, 57-58 (2d Cir. 2002))).
77. See U.S. CONST. art. III (establishing the judicial branch of the U. S. government).
78. See id. § 2, cl. 1 ("The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity,
arising under this Constitution .... "); see also Loren v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich.,
505 F.3d 598, 606-07 (6th Cir. 2007) (stating that in order to satisfy Article III's standing
requirements, the burden is on the plaintiff to show an injury in fact, harm caused by the
defendant, and that it is likely the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision (citing
Cleveland Branch NAACP v. City of Parma, 263 F.3d 513, 523-24 (6th Cir. 2001))).
79. See Loren, 505 F.3d at 607 ("If Plaintiffs cannot establish constitutional standing,
their claims must be dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction." (citing Cent. States
Se. & Sw. Areas Health & Welfare Fund v. Merck-Medco Managed Care, 433 F.3d 181, 198
(2d Cir. 2005))).
80. See Midfirst Bank v. Davenport, No. 3:07-CV-405, 2007 WL 4246271, at *2 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 29, 2007) ("To show standing ... in a foreclosure action, the plaintiff must show
that it is the holder of the note and the mortgage at the time the complaint was filed."). The
foreclosure plaintiff must also show that he or she is harmed, "usually by not having
received payments on the note." Id
81. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4 cmt. a (1997) (stating that
the note and mortgage are separable, but the person who only owns the mortgage is unable
to enforce it). The Restatement assumes that a transfer of the mortgage also transfers the
obligation absent intent to the contrary. Id. cmt. c. Strictly following the Restatement gives
the trustee the benefit of the doubt that the mortgage as well as the promissory was
transferred without evidence of documentation showing they were purposefully separated.
Id. However, the standing defense puts the onus on the trustee to show intent to transfer the
entire obligation-the note and the mortgage-by demanding proper documentation. There
is substantial contrary authority to support the rationale for the standing defense-that an
assignment without the obligation is a nullity. See, e.g., In re Hurricane Resort Co., 30 B.R.
258, 261 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983) (finding that the party instituting the foreclosure action
failed to show actual assignment and possession of the underlying promissory note and
therefore his assignment and claim of a secured lien was void as to the trustees in
bankruptcy).
82. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4 cmt. e (1997) ("[l]n
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In fall 2007, federal courts in Ohio began to enforce the standing
requirement draconically in foreclosure proceedings.83 In doing so, the
courts called into question the common practice where lending institutions
rush to file foreclosure actions, obtain default judgments, and collect
interest on the judgments that go unpaid.s4
In In re Foreclosure Cases,85 plaintiff- lender Deutsche Bank (DB)
sought to foreclose on nineteen securitized residential mortgages that it held
in trust.86  The court ordered DB to submit an affidavit showing it was
either the original mortgage holder or the assignee, trustee, or successor-in-
interest to the mortgage holder in each foreclosure proceeding. 87 In ten of
the cases, the note and mortgage attached to each complaint identified the
lender as the original lending institution, not DB.88 In four of the other
general, a mortgage is unenforceable if it is held by one who has no right to enforce the
secured obligation.").
83. See Boyko, No. 1:07cv2282, et al., 2007 WL 3232430,, at *1-3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2007) (dismissing fourteen foreclosure proceedings for lack of standing); In re
Foreclosure Actions, No. 1:07cv1007, et al., 2007 WL 4034554, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Nov. 14,
2007) [hereinafter O'Malley] (dismissing thirty-two foreclosure proceedings for lack of
standing); In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (ordering
twenty-seven plaintiffs to submit evidence showing that they had standing and that the court
had diversity jurisdiction or the court would dismiss their foreclosure cases).
84. See Boyko, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (discussing that the lenders' decisions to
file for foreclosure as fast as possible are driven by monetary concerns). Judge Boyko's
footnote three analogy (cited in the heading to this Note) shows that he believed that the
holders of securitized mortgages should not receive the benefit of the doubt in court to save
them transaction costs when their purchasing the securitized mortgages without paying a
transaction cost is the root of the problem. Id.
85. See id. at *1-3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31, 2007) (dismissing the foreclosure complaints
because plaintiff-lenders failed to satisfy their burden for demonstrating standing and failed
to meet the requirements of diversity jurisdiction).
86. See Clients & Friends Memo from Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft, L.L.P. at 2
(Nov. 16, 2007), http://www.cadwalader.com/assets/client friend/l 11607Foreclosure
CM.pdf [hereinafter Cadwalader Memo] ("Between July and October 2007, the plaintiffs,
trustees of securitization trusts, filed nineteen complaints against mortgagers who had
defaulted on their residential mortgages that had been sold into securitization trusts.").
87. See Boyko, 2007 WL 3232430, at *1 ("The Court's Amended General
Order... requires Plaintiff to submit an affidavit along with the Complaint, which identifies
Plaintiff either as the original mortgage holder, or as an assignee, trustee or successor-in-
interest.").
88. See id. ("[T]he attached Note and Mortgage identify the mortgagee and promisee
as the original lending institution-one other than the named Plaintiff."); see also
Cadwalader Memo, supra note 86, at 2 (stating that none of the ten cases where the
mortgage assignments occurred after the complaint was filed showed the named Plaintiff to
be the owner of the rights, title and interest as of the date of the complaint). The
assignments merely expressed a present intent to convey all the rights, title and interest and
the accompanying note to the plaintiff. Id.
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cases, DB failed to file any executed assignments showing it was the holder
of the notes and mortgages as of the date the complaints were filed. 9
Because DB could not satisfy its burden of demonstrating it had suffered an
injury in fact from nonpayment of the mortgages without documentation of
assignment, Judge Boyko of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of Ohio dismissed these fourteen complaints without prejudice on
the grounds that DB did not have standing to sue.90
This two-prong documentation requirement was further clarified two
weeks later by Judge O'Malley, also of the Northern District of Ohio, who
dismissed thirty-two foreclosure actions because the plaintiffs failed to
prove they were the trustees or assignees of the mortgages. 9' Sufficient
documentation for plaintiffs who hold securitized mortgages as trustees was
defined explicitly as "trust and/or assignment documents executed before
the action was commenced, or both as circumstances may require."92 In
other words, the plaintiff in a foreclosure proceeding is responsible for
showing (1) that the mortgagee and the plaintiff intended to assign both the
mortgage and the note to the plaintiff and (2) did in fact do so before the
plaintiff brought an action to foreclose.
1. Dismissal: When There is No Documentation of Assignment of the Note
and Mortgage
The holding of In re Foreclosure Cases is narrow.93 Judge Boyko did
not have any reason to believe that the obligations were not assigned to DB,
89. See Cadwalader Memo, supra note 86, at 2 ("In the other four cases, no mortgage
assignments were presented by the court's deadline.").
90. See Boyko, 2007 WL 3232430, at *1 ("After considering the submissions, along
with all the documents filed of record, the Court dismisses the captioned cases without
prejudice.").
91. See O'Malley, No. 1:07cv1007, et al., 2007 WL 4034554, at *1 (N.D. Ohio Nov.
14, 2007) (dismissing foreclosure actions because the plaintiff was not identified on the note
as the original holder and has either not filed adequate documentation demonstrating original
ownership or filed documentation indicating that an assignment occurred before the filing of
the complaint).
92. Id. Judge O'Malley further stated that "an affidavit alone, in which the affiant
attests that the plaintiff is the owner and holder of the note and mortgage, is
insufficient...." Id. But see Bank of New York v. Stuart, No. 06CA008953, 2007 WL
936706, at *2-3 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. March 30, 2007) (finding that the plaintiff-lender had
standing to bring a foreclosure action against the defendant even though the assignment of
the note did not take effect until five months after the date of the complaint because the
assignor would have been precluded from bringing suit).
93. See Cadwalader Memo, supra note 86, at 1 ("Although the cases appear to have
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only that the bank's records were sloppy.94 By implication, if the good faith
of DB had been in question, the court would have required documentary
proof to determine whether the mortgage originator and DB entered into a
true sale rather than relying on DB's word.95 Furthermore, the mortgagors
could not be expected to know to whom they owed payments.96 The court
dismissed ten of the cases because it had no documents showing that the
mortgages had been assigned to DB at all.97  Notably, the court did not
dismiss five of the cases where the mortgage assignments were executed
and recorded before the complaints were filed.98 Judge Boyko's opinion
raised concern among secondary market participants, the holding of In re Foreclosure Cases
is narrow and limited.").
94. See Boyko, 2007 WL 3232430, at *2 ("The Assignments, in every instance,
express a present intent to convey all rights, title and interest in the Mortgage and the
accompanying Note to the Plaintiff named in the caption of the Foreclosure Complaint upon
receipt of sufficient consideration on the date the Assignment was signed and notarized.").
The court indicated that it did not doubt that the plaintiff owned the assignments, but
stressed that DB must show the court that the purchase agreement was "executed as of the
date of the Foreclosure Complaint." Id. (emphasis added).
95. Judge Boyko's rationale departs from the reasoning of the Restatement of
Mortgages, which assumes that the common intent of mortgagees and assignees is to keep
the mortgage and obligation together when assigning them. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4 cmt. a (1997) ("It is conceivable that on rare occasions a
mortgagee will wish to disassociate the obligation and the mortgage, but that result should
follow only upon evidence that the parties to the transfer so agreed. The far more common
intent is to keep the two rights combined."). Therefore, the Restatement only requires
determining intent in a situation where the mortgagee intentionally disassociated the
mortgage and the obligation, whereas Judge Boyko shifted the burden onto the assignee to
prove that it was a bona fide purchaser rather than assuming as such. See Boyko, 2007 WL
3232430, at *1 (ordering plaintiff-lenders to file a copy of the executed assignment
demonstrating that they were the holders and owners of the note and mortgage).
96. See Boyko, 2007 WL 3232430, at *2 (noting the importance of documenting
mortgage assignments of real property in writing). This is a real problem from the
mortgagor's perspective even in situations where the mortgagor is not in default. For a fact
pattern illustrating how easily a defendant-mortgagor can be confused as to whom she is
supposed to pay her mortgage, see Washington Mutual Bank, F.A. v. Green, 806 N.E.2d
604, 605 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004).
97. See Cadwalader Memo, supra note 86, at 2 (stating that the ten cases where the
mortgage assignments occurred after the complaint was filed did not show the plaintiff to be
the owner of the rights, title and interest under the mortgage at issue), see also Boyko, 2007
WL 3232430, at *1 (finding that the notes and mortgages identify the mortgagee and
promisee as the original lending institution rather than the plaintiff and that there is no
reference to the plaintiff in the recorded chain of title). Indeed, sloppy paperwork accounted
for the lack of proof of executed assignments. Id. In ten cases, the assignments were not
executed as of the date of filing the Complaint. See Cadwalader Memo, supra note 86, at 3
("The basis for the court's dismissal of ten of the cases is that the mortgage assignments
were executed and recorded after the complaints in each case were filed.").
98. See Cadwalader Memo, supra note 86, at 3 ("In the five cases that were not
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indicates that he was reacting to the audacity of the plaintiffs attorney (and
by implication the institutional lenders he represented) who were essentially
asking the court to ignore the fact that DB did not keep accurate paperwork
in order to speed up the foreclosure process.99
In another foreclosure case decided in the Northern District of Ohio
fifteen days later, Judge Rose ordered the plaintiff-lenders in twenty-seven
cases to submit documentation within thirty days showing they had
standing when the complaint was filed or he would dismiss their cases
without prejudice.' 00 Judge Rose spoke directly about the role that the
plaintiffs' noncompliance played in his decision, even reprimanding one
plaintiff's attorney for his conspiracy in the plaintiff's failure to produce
documentation of assignment.' ' Notably, neither Judge Rose's opinion
nor the other opinions from Ohio preclude plaintiff-lenders from re-filing
with sufficient paperwork in situations where the court dismisses the
complaints because it is perturbed by the plaintiffs insolence, but does not
doubt the plaintiff's sincerity. 10 2  Therefore, plaintiffs can easily cure
standing if the mortgage and note were in fact assigned in the first place.'0 3
dismissed, the mortgage assignments were executed and recorded before the complaints
were filed.").
99. See Boyko, 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 ("Plaintiff's, 'Judge, you just don't
understand how things work,' argument reveals a condescending mindset and quasi-
monopolistic system where financial institutions have traditionally controlled, and still
control, the foreclosure process."). Astoundingly, even the Restatement contemplates the
failure to document transfers carefully, creating rules that give transferors and transferees
little to no incentive to do so. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.4 cmt.
a (1997) ("[E]xperience suggests that, with fair frequency, mortgagees fail to document their
transfers so carefully. This section's purpose is generally to achieve the same result even if
one of the two aspects of the transfer is omitted.").
100. See In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (ordering
twenty-seven plaintiffs to submit evidence showing that they had standing and that the court
had diversity jurisdiction or the court would dismiss their foreclosure cases).
101. See id. at 655 (stating that since the plaintiff's attorney is well aware of the rule
requiring documents showing the plaintiff owns the note and mortgage, "failure in the future
by this attorney to comply with the filing requirements ... may only be considered to be
willful").
102. See id at 654 ("[Pjlaintiffs are given until not later than thirty days following entry
of this order to submit evidence showing that they had standing .... Failure to do so will
result in dismissal without prejudice to refilling.. . ."); Boyko, 2007 WL 3232430, at *1
("After considering the submissions, along with all the documents filed of record, the Court
dismisses the captioned cases without prejudice."); O'Malley, No. 1:07cv1007, et al., 2007
WL 4034554, at *1 (Nov. 14, 2007) ("This case is DISMISSED without prejudice.").
103. Cf O'Malley, 2007 WL 4034554, at *1 (dismissing the complaints without
prejudice).
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2. Sanctions: When the Mortgage Assignment is Misrepresented to the
Court
In furtherance of the Ohio federal courts' actions to defend mortgagors
in foreclosure proceedings, at least one bankruptcy court in Massachusetts
has invoked its power under Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure'04 to sanction a plaintiff-lender where the court had evidence that
the plaintiff-lender was not the holder of the note, but represented itself as
the holder to the court.' °5  In In re Nosek, 0 6 without even addressing
whether it was the intent of the mortgagee and the plaintiff to assign the
note and the mortgage to the plaintiff, the court fined plaintiff-lender
Ameriquest under its Rule 9011 sanction powers, stating: 0 7 "The argument
that the assignment of the note and mortgage was a matter of public record
and therefore the Debtor knew or should have known of Norwest's identity
[as the assignee of the note originated by Americquest] is relevant but
disingenuous, indeed even arrogant." °10 8 In In re Nosek, although the court
admitted that it was imposing sanctions on the plaintiff as punishment for
misrepresenting itself to the court, there was no evidence that Ameriquest
104. See FED. R. BANK. P. 9011(c) (establishing sanctions for violations of the rule that
by presenting a document to the court an attorney is certifying that to the best of her
knowledge, information, and belief it is not being presented for any improper purpose, and
that the claims are warranted and have evidentiary support).
105. See In re Nosek, 386 B.R. 374, 378 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2008), vacated, 406 B.R. 434
(D. Mass. 2009) (explaining that Ameriquest was the loan originator, but not the note holder
as of the date of the debtor's bankruptcy petition). This information was not revealed to the
Court until September 27, 2007 even though the debtor's petition was filed on October 2,
2002. Id. at 377.
106. See id. at 385-86 (imposing sanctions on a loan originator, its attorneys, and the
current holder of the loan for misrepresentations that were made in bankruptcy proceedings).
107. See id. at 383 ("This Court finds that Ameriquest made repeated
misrepresentations and its behavior in failing to properly disclose its role was unreasonable
under the circumstances.... Therefore Ameriquest is sanctioned $250,000.").
108. Id. at 382. Judge Rosenthal's reasoning is lifted directly from the Restatement of
Mortgages, which states, "The mere recordation of the mortgage assignment in the public
records does not constitute notice to the mortgagor, since to so hold would in effect impose
on mortgagors a duty to examine the record title to their land before making each payment-
plainly an unreasonable burden." RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: MORTGAGES § 5.5 cmt. c
(1997). The lender's argument that the mortgagor had notice was entirely irrelevant to
Ameriquest's main argument-that the attorneys should assume they are the holder in due
course without proof. See In re Nosek, 386 B.R. at 382 ("The argument that.., the Debtor
knew or should have known of Norwest's identity is relevant but ... many of these same
parties asserting this position allege they had no way of knowing about the assignment.").
The bankruptcy court's holding echoes Judge Boyko's and further cuts against the
Restatement.
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had misrepresented itself to the debtor.' °9 Despite this fact, the court gave
the debtor, rather than the lender and its successor-in-interest, the benefit of
the doubt." 0
3. Tougher Solutions: When the Plaintiff is Not the Holder in Due Course
Requiring plaintiffs to have standing matters because there is a real
question as to whether assignees were bona fide purchasers of the
mortgage," 1 in addition to the problems that arise when the same mortgage
is in two or three different pools. 12 The industry has excused its lack of
assignment paperwork as sloppy housekeeping,"l3 but sloppy housekeeping
can no longer cover up the fact that the lack of documentation has become a
constant business practice in the wake of securitized mortgages. 14 Many
109. See In re Nosek, 386 B.R. at 382 (noting Ameriquest's argument that proof of the
debtor's knowledge of the true identity of the mortgage holder was found in the debtor's
own schedules and matrix). Arguably, In re Nosek is an extreme example because the
lawsuit dragged on for five years, various law firms represented the plaintiff, and the
defendant sought to join other plaintiffs who were similarly negligent in telling the court
who held the note. Id. at 377-80.
110. See id at 382 ("This Court will not countenance creditors and creditors' attorneys
holding themselves to a different and clearly lower standard than what they expect of the
Debtor.... It is the creditor's responsibility to keep a borrower and the Court informed as
to who owns the note and mortgage. .. ").
111. See Bob Ivry, Banks Lose to Deadbeat Homeowners as Loans Sold in Bonds
Vanish, BLOOMBERG, Feb. 22, 2008, available at http://www.bloomberg.com/
apps/news?pid=20670001&refer=us&sid=aejJZdqodTCM (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) ("In
the rush to originate more loans during the United States mortgage boom, from 2003 to
2006, that assignment of ownership wasn't always properly completed.. .. ") (on file with
Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
112. See Gretchen Morgenson, Foreclosures Hit a Snag for Lenders, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
15, 2007 (reporting the claim that in several instances mortgage experts have observed the
same loan in several different mortgage pools).
113. Cf Boyko, No. 1:07cv2282, et al., 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct.
31, 2007) (criticizing plaintiff-lender's argument that Judge Boyko does not understand how
things work in the mortgage-lending industry and therefore he should excuse its lack of
documentation); Ivry, supra note Ill (explaining that banks are used to using the excuse
that they lost the note and the court pushing the foreclosure through anyway); Mike Stuckey,
'Angel' of Foreclosure Defense Bedevils Lenders, MSBNC.coM, Dec. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/28277420/ (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (quoting one attorney
describing the sloppiness, fraud and outright criminality she sees in the mortgage lending
industry) (on file with Washington and Lee Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
114. See Ivry, supra note 111 (describing the pattern and practice of mortgage servicers
and securitizing banks of filing a "lost-note affidavit" when they fail to present proof to the
court that they own a mortgage). Lost-note affidavits are the rule in the industry rather than
the exception. Id.
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courts, even those outside of Ohio, have taken note and no longer accept the
"take my word for it"1 5 defense to standing requirements." 
6
Even more troubling is that the lack of recorded assignments of
mortgages may not be attributable to sloppy housekeeping at all. April
Charney, 17 a leading defense attorney in foreclosure proceedings in
Florida, has argued that in many instances the original mortgages were
assigned without the notes in violation of true sale obligationsH18 under
securities law. 19 This could explain the trustees' widespread lack of
documentation. 120  Moreover, it reinforces the need for courts to enforce
standing requirements to defeat the outdated presumption that the
assignment of the note was transferred with the mortgage absent intent to
the contrary.
In conclusion, courts need to take a more active role in protecting the
homeowner from willful noncompliance by trustees of securitized
mortgages. This may require imposing sanctions on attorneys where, as in
Nosek, noncompliance arguably masks the fact that the plaintiff is not the
holder in due course. Fortunately, the sua sponte imposition of standing
may curb the willful failure problem, as plaintiffs can no longer rely on
115. Id.
116. See, e.g., id. (discussing that California Bankruptcy Judge Samuel L. Bufford
requires plaintiff-lenders to bring the mortgage notes to court because problems underlying
mortgage securitization has caused him to doubt that promissory notes are sufficient to show
that plaintiff has a right to enforce that note).; see also Gretchen Morgenson, Guess What
Got Lost in the Loan Pool?, N.Y. TIMES, March 1, 2009, at BU1 (discussing judges in other
states who are requiring formal proof of assignment).
117. April Charney is an attorney with Jacksonville, Florida Legal Aid. For more
information about April Chamey and her work representing homeowners facing foreclosure
see Stuckey, supra note 113.
118. See Vinodkothari.com, The True Sale Question, http://www.vinodkothari.com/
truesale.htm (last visited Sept. 16, 2009) (explaining that true sale rules protect investors by
giving them an unqualified right over the assets being securitized) (on file with Washington
and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice). If true sale requirements are
not met, then the investors are unsecured lenders and do not have a priority right to
receivables. Id.
119. See Stuckey, supra note 113 ("'What we see is that systematically, the originating
lenders only pledged these loans and didn't actually transfer them' to the trusts that are
supposed to hold them and issue the securities ....").
120. But see Cadwalader Memo, supra note 86, at 4 (evidencing the belief that the
trustees were acting in good faith and merely could not find the paperwork due to logistical
reasons). "While this may cause certain logistical issues for the trustees and servicers of the
defaulted mortgage loans, we do not believe that the decision itself has any broader legal
significance." Id. For another source attributing the trustee's lack of paperwork to oversight
see Ivry, supra note 111 (quoting an attorney who also blames the lack of paperwork on
logistical reasons).
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courts to rubber stamp their foreclosure proceedings. 121 Another solution is
for courts to go a step further and dismiss cases with prejudice when the
court decides that plaintiff-lenders will never be able to present documents
sufficient to show assignment or ownership before the date the complaint
was filed because they do not exist.
122
a. Standing Will Incentivize Loan Renegotiation
At first glance, standing is not a permanent solution because it does
not address the underlying issue. 123 The standing defense doesn't void the
mortgage. 24  Nor is its success likely to result in dismissal with
prejudice. 125  Defending a foreclosure proceeding takes both time and
money. Even if a homeowner can afford a defense attorney and is able to
prevail, she might prefer to avoid litigation entirely. Finally, as has already
been mentioned, there is no bar preventing plaintiff-lenders from refiling.1
26
However, one positive aspect of the standing defense is that by making
it more costly for trustees to instigate foreclosure proceedings, mortgagors
will have leverage to renegotiate the terms of the underlying loan. 27  If
121. See Midfirst Bank v. Davenport, No. 3:07-CV-405, 2007 WL 4246271, at *1 (S.D.
Ohio Nov. 29, 2007) ("Because standing involves the federal court's subject matter
jurisdicion, it can be raised sua sponte.").
122. Cf O'Malley, No. 1:07cv1007, et al., 2007 WL 4034554, at *1 (Nov. 14, 2007)
(dismissing the foreclosure actions without prejudice because the foreclosure plaintiff did
not provide documentation that it was the owner and holder of the note and mortgage at the
time the foreclosure action was filed).
123. See Stuckey, supra note 113 ("Making an issue out of the actual ownership of the
securitized title might strike some as a shameless stalling tactic aimed at abetting a debtor
who, after all, owes the money."). Nor is it always an available defense. See New York v.
Stuart, No. 06CA008953, 2007 WL 936706, at *2-3 (Ohio App. 9 Dist. March 30, 2007)
(finding that the plaintiff-lender had standing to bring a foreclosure action against the
defendant even though the assignment of the note did not take effect until after the complaint
was filed); see also Stuckey, supra note 113 (noting that the standing defense is one among
many that attorneys utilize to assist homeowners facing foreclosure).
124. See In re Williams, 395 B.R. 33, 42 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 2008) ("The Trustee's
position is that the failure to record an assignment of a mortgage in Ohio allows the Trustee
as a bonafide purchaser to void the mortgage lien held by the assignee of the mortgage. The
court does not agree.").
125. Cf In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 654 (S.D. Ohio 2007)
(dismissing the complaints without prejudice).
126. See, e.g., In re Williams, 395 B.R. at 49 (dismissing plaintiffs suit without
prejudice).
127. See Stuckey, supra note 113 (discussing attorney April Charney's strategy of
settling cases by using the flaws she exposes in debt ownership and loan servicing to
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courts across the country were to enforce standing requirements on
plaintiffs who hold securitized mortgages in trust, then the transaction costs
of foreclosure proceedings may dissuade trustees from filing when they do
not have their paperwork ready.128 Alternatively, in cases where "sufficient
documentation" does not exist, the widespread imposition of standing
requirements may encourage trustees to look favorably on loan
renegotiation.
29
In sum, when the plaintiff-lender is not actually the holder in due
course, the standing defense restores justice to foreclosure proceedings so
long as the court holds the plaintiff to the formal standards set out by Judge
Boyko in Ohio. When the plaintiff-lender is the holder in due course but
has for logistical reasons misplaced original documents showing that the
entire obligation was assigned to the plaintiff prior to filing the complaint,
the standing defense works, but only as a temporary warning to the
mortgage industry participants about the formality involved in real property
proceedings.130  It is important that courts recognize when they are
confronted with each scenario. The upside to a case-by-case approach is
that some of the costs of securitization, which were never internalized, can
finally be assigned to the parties responsible for its high costs.
IV. Legislative Solutions
Outside of litigation, mortgagors facing default may have the option to
renegotiate their mortgage loans. Many nontraditional mortgages'3 are
renegotiate mortgages for her clients).
128. See id. (discussing that once the loan servicer cannot profit from a foreclosure
proceeding, it lies dormant); Morgenson, supra note 112 ("The people who put the deals
together get paid for the deals, but they don't get paid for the paperwork."). For a discussion
of the costs associated with maintaining the paperwork underlying securitized mortgages,
see Ivry, supra note 111 (citing a figure of $45,000 a month to store loan paperwork).
129. However, critics of the standing defense argue that there is no incentive for lenders
to settle once they know they will not make a further profit from the mortgage.
130. Whether or not the plaintiff is a holder in due course shown by the intent of the
parties at the time of assignment or the plaintiff has been assigned the mortgage only in
violation of true sale requirements is irrelevant to the repercussion: Neither plaintiff will be
able to bring foreclosure without proper documentation.
131. This discussion of mortgagors who want to renegotiate the terms of their
mortgages is not limited to subprime borrowers. It has become increasingly problematic for
borrowers with Alt-A mortgages and even prime nontraditional mortgages to repay their
mortgages once the mortgages have been reset. See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 729
(noting the upcoming resets of Alt-A and prime nontraditional mortgages).
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adjustable rate loans which are subject to payment resets, meaning the
interest rate spikes after two or three years at the starter rate. 132 After the
interest rate increase, monthly payments increase, and many homeowners
are no longer able to make their monthly payments) 33 Homeowners who
were faced with the same situation in the past could refinance their
mortgage. However, the decrease in home values and the tightening of the
credit market have reduced the availability of refinancing options for
homeowners. 1
34
The advantage of renegotiating the terms of the loan is that it can
avoid default scenarios altogether. 135 Since foreclosures reduce the value of
homes in entire neighborhoods, preventing default will have a three-fold
effect on homeowners: it will keep homeowners who can pay a more
reasonable monthly mortgage in their homes; it will help maintain home
values of houses in entire neighborhoods; and it will protect neighbors who
are not in default from defaulting on loans that greatly exceed the current
value of their homes. 136 Preventing foreclosure will also benefit the trustees
of securitized debt instruments. MBSs held by trustees will have some of
their original value restored and trustees will be saved the costs of
instigating foreclosure proceedings when the benefit of receiving reduced
payments would outweigh the cost of litigation.
37
132. For example, a 3-year subprime hybrid ARM taken out in 2003 could have an
interest rate of 7% until 2006 and then could spike to 10% after the reset depending on the
level of market interest rates. See id. at 730 (describing a typical subprime loan as providing
a starter rate between 7 and 9% but increasing as much as 3% within the first year after
reset).
133. See id (characterizing the increased monthly payments as a steep "payment shock"
for borrowers). Furthermore, many such nontraditional mortgages subject borrowers to
prepayment penalties if they were to repay the loan while the starter rate applied. Id.
134. See id. ("In today's ... challenging environment, payment reset will lead less often
to refinancing and more often to default and foreclosure.").
135. See id. at 729 (proposing that loan modifications provide the best way to avoid
foreclosures and provide for long-term solutions).
136. See id. at 732 (noting that modifying loans before resets would permit borrowers
to stay in their homes, preserve neighborhoods, and provide investors with great returns than
they would receive from foreclosures).
137. See id. at 734 ("Permitting borrowers with an ability to make reasonable payments
to stay in their home would provide greater value to lenders and investors than forcing
foreclosures ... ").
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A. Loan Servicers Can Renegotiate Loans by Contract Right
The first problem that arises when a loan is renegotiated is whether
loan servicers, who collect payments from homeowners to give to trustees
to hold for the bondholders, have the power to renegotiate loans with
individual homeowners. Arguably, they do despite the fact that
securitization complicates the issue. 138 MBSs are governed by contractual
arrangements known as pooling and servicing agreements (PSAs) entered
into by all parties to the transaction, including loan servicers and
bondholders. 139  By contract, loan servicers are required to protect the
interests of bondholders and conduct a net present value (NPV) analysis
when determining the appropriate loss mitigation strategy in a default
scenario. 140  As the American Securitization Forum has pointed out, loan
servicers should be bound to the interests of the bondholders. 14' However,
because bondholders are divided into different tranches with potentially
dissimilar interests, servicers cannot always tell what actions will be in
bondholder's best interests. 142 But nothing in a typical PSA prevents loan
138. See id. at 731 ("While initially there was concern that securitization... might
place limits on the ability of servicers to modify loans in the securitization pool, most
documents provide the servicers with sufficient flexibility to modify loans.").
139. See Robin S. Golden & Sameera Fazili, Raising the Roof" Addressing the
Mortgage Foreclosure Crisis Through Collaboration Between City Government and a Law
School Clinic, 2 ALB. GOv'T L. REv 29, 38 (2009) (listing loan sellers, depositors, trustees,
investors, servicers, insurers, and ratings agencies as the potential parties to the MBS
transaction).
140. See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 731 ("While the language varies, the majority
of PSAs require that servicers: (1) protect the interests of investors, and (2) conduct a net
present value (NPV) analysis when determining the appropriate loss mitigation strategy in a
default scenario."). For more information about methods of determining loss mitigation, see
Foreclosure Prevention: The Importance of Loss Mitigation Strategies in Keeping Families
in Their Homes: Field Hearing Before the H.R. Subcomm. on Housing and Community
Opportunity, 10th Cong. 17 (2007) (statement of Tara Twomey, Of Counsel, National
Consumer Law Center).
141. See American Securitization Forum, Statement of Principles, Recommendations
and Guidelines for the Modification of Securitized Subprime Residential Mortgage Loans, 4
(June 2007), http://www.americansecuritization.com/uploadedFiles/ASF%20Subprime%20
Loan%20Modification%2OPrinciples_060107.pdf ("Generally, the ASF believes that loan
modifications should only be made... [i]n a manner that is in the best interests of the
borrower... ").
142. See Golden & Fazili, supra note 139, at 39 ("[1]nvestors themselves are different
classes with competing interests, and thus cannot speak in one unified voice to direct the
servicers."). See also Eggert, infra note 145, at 279 (defining "tranche warfare" as the
divergence of bondholders' interests). Furthermore, sometimes it would be impossible for
bondholders to share a common "best interest" at all.
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servicers from renegotiating loans with individual homeowners in situations
where the NPV of modification exceeds that of allowing a loan to go into
foreclosure.
43
B. Who Should Facilitate Loan Renegotiation?
The second problem that arises when a loan is renegotiated is deciding
who should facilitate loan renegotiation: private actors, state actors, or
federal actors. By examining all three briefly, it will become apparent that
federal action is necessary for two reasons: First, because federal law
preempts most state usury laws, state laws are not efficient regulators,'
44
and second, financial institutions do not have an honest track record of self-
regulation and are unlikely to voluntarily renegotiate loans themselves even
if it is in their best interest.
145
1. Private Loan Modification is Idealistic
The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) recently advocated
a systematic and voluntary private loan modification program for subprime
Adjustable Rate Mortgage (ARM) loans for owner-occupied properties
where borrowers are current on their payments but will not be able to make
the payments after the interest rates are reset.146 Sheila Bair, Chairman of
the FDIC, unveiled the plan that recommends servicers modify loans so that
borrowers pay the same amount of interest that they paid under the starter
rate even after the loans are reset.1
47
143. See Eggert, infra note 145, at 287 ("PSAs often grant the servicer a certain amount
of discretion in modifying loans....").
144. See infra note 162 (citing how financial actors have used federal preemption laws
to bully states).
145. See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 731 (arguing that because servicers are bound
to the interests of bondholders in the aggregate and because renegotiating loans will often be
less expensive than foreclosing that trustees should be incentivized to modify loans and keep
borrowers in their houses). But see Kurt Eggert, Comment on Michael A. Stegman et al. 's
"Preventing Servicing is Good for Business and Affordable Homeownership Policy: "What
Prevents Loan Modifications?, 18 HOUSING POL'y DEBATE 279, 290 (2007) (listing the
disincentives servicers have to modify loans, such as the fact that late charges comprise a
substantial portion of their income).
146. See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 731 (recommending that servicers modify
loans of homeowners who have remained current on their payments but may not remain
current when the rate resets).
147. See id. (advising that servicers modify loans to keep the starter rate for a period of
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The advantages of Bair's plan are apparent. It can be implemented
immediately, it is inexpensive, and it is voluntary. Private loan
modification can be instigated as soon as possible because it does not
require federal legislation, and a systematic approach is faster than a loan-
by-loan approach. 148 Bair's plan does not require federal spending. 149 And
finally, because it is voluntary, the policy does not affect the legal rights of
bondholders by modifying their contractual rights and subjecting servicers
to liability. 5 °
But its disadvantages are also apparent. There is no time frame
requiring servicers to modify loans immediately. Asking an entire industry
to change its practice will take time even if all the servicers agree to
implement the policy.' 5' Additionally, there is no monetary incentive to
make servicers reach out to borrowers. 52 Because voluntary modification
is a preventative remedy, if loan servicers do not initiate loan modifications
soon, homeowners will not receive the potential benefits before their
interest rates reset and they default. 53 Furthermore, there is no reward (or
punishment) for servicers who modify (or fail to modify) loans
voluntarily. 154 A fuzzy duty not to harm bondholders will not incentivize
loan servicers even after this duty is made known to them. 55 Arguably,
preventing more foreclosures is too important to wait for an industry to
incentivize itself. In sum, the plan is overly idealistic because it relies on
five years or more).
148. See id. ("A streamlined approach can be undertaken much more rapidly than a
loan-by-loan restructuring process.").
149. See id. ("[T]his approach does not involve a bailout involving federal tax
dollars.").
150. See id. ("[T]his policy does not involve government action that would affect the
contractual rights of mortgage investors because it is based on voluntary action by the
servicers.").
151. For example, as a threshold matter, servicers must adopt guidelines they will use
to determine whether a borrower will not be able to pay her mortgage after the reset period.
See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 732 (citing as a substantial accomplishment the set of
guidelines that the American Securitization Forum and the Hope Now Alliance developed to
be adopted as the standard practices for loan modifications).
152. See id. (pointing to advantages of the systemic loan modification approach, none
of which are monetary incentives).
153. See id. ("[Nlow is the time to show progress. Servicers must demonstrate an
aggressive effort to dramatically increase the pace of loan modifications.").
154. See id. (encouraging servicers, by appealing to practicality, to adopt a systemic
approach to loan modifications).
155. See infra notes 164-165 (discussing servicers' fiduciary duty to bondholders); see
also Eggert, supra note 145 and accompanying text (listing disincentives to modify loans).
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loan servicers to act in the long-term best interests of bondholders rather
than in their own immediate self-interest.
156
Another drawback to FDIC's plan is that it is narrowly tailored to
work for loans that subject mortgagors to interest rate resets, but does not
address nontraditional mortgages that pose different problems for
borrowers. 157 Borrowers with Alt-A or nontraditional prime mortgages may
require more lenient loan renegotiations as homeowners find themselves
paying loans on houses which are not worth as much as they owe) 5 8 When
a homeowner owes more on her house than it is worth, the problem facing
loan servicers is a lack of guidance, not a lack of incentive. 159 In these
cases, where the problems facing homeowners are more individualized, it is
too much to ask servicers to voluntarily renegotiate loans on an individual
basis without clear guidelines because this could change the attributes of
the loan and affect the rights of bondholders. 1
60
2. State Laws Are Preempted
State actors were the first parties to be proactive and try to remedy the
mortgage foreclosure crisis because they were the first to observe its
negative local effects.' 6 1 However, many states, especially smaller ones,
were met with resistance by financial actors who denied that the state had
authority or jurisdiction over them citing federal preemption laws.162 The
156. To reiterate, this argument assumes that what is in the best interests of bondholders
(1) exists and (2) can be ascertained, See supra note 142 and accompanying text (describing
the difficulty of determining bondholders' best interests).
157. See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 734 (recommending that services apply the
same systematic approaches to restructuring nontraditional loans as they do to subprime
hybrid ARMs).
158. See id. ("[S]ome borrowers pose even more difficult issues because their debt far
exceeds the value of their homes.").
159. See id. (explaining that the loan servicers are incentivized to renegotiate the loans
to prevent the mortgagor from walking away from her property without losing money).
160. See id. at 734 (stating that servicers should decide whether writedowns of the
balance to match the value of the home or forgiveness of arrearages of principal and interest
will be a better option than foreclosure or short sale).
161. See, e.g., Press Release, California Office of the Governor, Gov Schwarzenegger
Works with Lenders to Help Homeowners Avoid Foreclosure (Nov. 20, 2007), available at
http://gov.ca.gov/press-release/8147 (last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (highlighting the California
Governor's plan to work with loan servicers to remedy the foreclosure crisis) (on file with
Washington and Lee University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
162. Golden & Fazili, supra note 139, at 41 ("[Sjtate governmental actors found
themselves increasingly limited by the rising power of federal preemption in the financial
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federal government's increasing preemption of state usury laws has led to
the current status: Strong state consumer protection laws are preempted by
weak federal regulations.
163
3. Federal Laws Can Incentivize Servicers to Modify Loans
a. A Statutory Fiduciary Duty to Bondholders
One solution that could incentivize servicers to modify loans is to
codify an affirmative fiduciary duty that servicers owe to bondholders, so
long as the law does not modify investors' existing contractual rights.'
64
This would provide servicers with enough legal certainty to allow them to
proceed with a private loan modification program such as the FDIC's
plan. 65 However, a statutory fiduciary duty will only incentivize servicers
to modify loans when it is unquestionably in the bondholders' best
interests.
166
b. Revive the Home Owners Loan Corporation
Another possible solution is for the federal government to pass
legislation that is based on the principles that fueled the Home Owners'
Loan Corporation (HOLC), a federal agency established in 1933 by the
Home Owner's Loan Act.167 The HOLC gave relief to homeowners who
were in or near default by buying their mortgages from banks (in return for
industry.").
163. See id. at 67 ("While robbing the states of many tools they once used to protect
consumers, the federal government has not simultaneously stepped in to offer its own
comprehensive set of consumer protections to replace state protections.").
164. Bair Testimony, supra note 2 at 733. For an analysis of how a fiduciary duty
could arise between servicer and mortgagor through the courts, see Nathan Hanning, Waking
from the American Dream: Expanding Fiduciary Duties to Secondary Lenders Following
the Subprime Mortgage Meltdown, 38 Sw. L. REv. 141 (2008).
165. See Bair Testimony, supra note 2, at 733. (discussing that one of the reasons that
servicers cite to explain the slow pace of loan modification is concern about their legal
liability to investors).
166. For a discussion of why loan servicers might prefer foreclosure proceedings to
loan renegotiations, see Eggert, supra note 145 and accompanying text. For a discussion of
why bondholders will rarely agree, see the discussion of tranche warfare. Id. at 279.
167. See Alan S. Blinder, From the New Deal, a Way Out of a Mess, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb.
24, 2008, at 6 (describing the history of HOLC).
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government bonds) and issuing mortgages with more affordable terms to
homeowners. 68 Essentially, the government created the credit needed to
provide homeowners with the opportunity to refinance their loans.' 69
A similar program that affords homeowners the opportunity to
refinance their loans at lower interest rates would mean homeowners do not
have to rely on servicers (who are hesitant to risk legal liability) to modify
loans. The entire incentive problem would melt away because individual
borrowers would be deciding for themselves whether to refinance. 7 °
Although this remedy is fraught with the problems that characterize most
political decisions, it has the potential to absorb the costs of
securitization. 71  As a result it is the least expensive and most direct
remedy that is practicable. 172 And most notably, it is a permanent solution.
V Conclusion
One of the fundamental problems of the mortgage foreclosure crisis is
answering the question: Who should pay for the costs of securitization?
173
Both of the solutions discussed in this Note directly address this problem.
The standing defense shifts the burden onto the party claiming the right to
foreclose to prove it is the holder in due course and entitled to the remedy
168. Id.
169. Id.
170. See Chris Arnold, Housing Fix? Republicans Push for 4 Percent Loans, NPR.ORG,
Feb. 8, 2009, available at http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyld=100259536
(last visited Oct. 19, 2009) (discussing a plan to lower interest rates to enable homeowners to
refinance their mortgages and pay less per month) (on file with Washington and Lee
University Journal of Civil Rights and Social Justice).
171. See Blinder, supra note 167 (arguing that it may even make money: "Given
current low interest rates, a new HOLC could borrow cheaply and should find it easy to earn
a two-percentage point spread between borrowing and lending rates, for a gross profit of
maybe $4 billion to $8 billion a year").
172. While the FDIC voluntary renegotiation plan as proposed will not cost the federal
government any money, critics have pointed out that without a direct monetary incentive to
servicers it is unlikely to succeed. See PICO AND CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING,
COMMON-SENSE SOLUTIONS FOR SAVING HOMES AND COMMUNITIES (2009),
http://www.responsiblelending.org/mortgage-lending/policy-legislation/congress/common-
sense-solutions-for-saving-homes-and-communities.pdf (arguing that voluntary loan
modification programs are not stemming the tide of foreclosures). The factsheet points to
four obstacles in the way of voluntary loan modification: (1) fear of investor lawsuits, (2)
lack of servicer incentives, (3) second liens on houses, and (4) limited servicer and staff
technology. Id.
173. Boyko, No. 1:07cv2282, et al. 2007 WL 3232430, at *3 n.3 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 31,
2007).
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of foreclosure. Shifting the burden onto trustees' shoulders defrays the
costs of securitization onto trustees. While this solution is retroactive and
formalistic (it fails to penalize the loan originators, the investment bankers
who pooled the mortgages, and the investors who gobbled them up), it
solves one problem: That mortgagors should not pay for the transaction
costs created by securitization, a process that took place after their loans
originated and without their consent.
On the other hand, loan renegotiation reasons that all parties to the
loan were complicit in the process of securitization, and all parties should
share equally in its costs. In the long run, all parties benefit from loan
renegotiation-homeowners prevent default and stay in their homes and the
stream of payments that reaches bondholders is greater than what they
would have received had the houses been sold in foreclosure proceedings.
The immediate problems, though, are incentivizing loan servicers to enter
into renegotiation and insulating loan servicers from suit. This can best be
done with federal legislation requiring servicers to act and predetermining
the legal duty they owe to bondholders.
In conclusion, a federal law calling for proactive loan renegotiation in
conjunction with formal standing requirements has the potential to be a
permanent, narrowly tailored solution to stem the eight million foreclosures
predicted in the next four years.14
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CENTER FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, NEVADA FORECLOSURES: IMPACT AND OPPORTUNITY
(2009), http://www.responsiblelending.org/pdfs/us-foreclosure-fact-sheet.pdf.

